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Design/methodology/approach: By combining two sources of information about 683 Mexican 
subsidised industry-university partnerships from 2009 to 2016, this study adopted the structural equation 
modelling (SEM) to analyse the effect of collaborative vs. opportunistic behaviours in intellectual 
capital dynamics within subsidised projects.  
 
Purpose: Little is known about how subsidies enhance both collaborative and opportunistic behaviours 
within subsidised industry-university partnerships, and how partners’ behaviours influence the 
intellectual capital dynamics within subsidised industry-university. Based on these theoretical 
foundations, this study expects to understand IC’s contribution as a dynamic or systemic process 
(inputs→outputs→outcomes) within subsided university-industry partnerships. Especially to contribute 
to these ongoing academic debates, this paper analyses how collaborative and opportunistic behaviours 
within industry-university partnerships influence the intellectual capital dynamics (inputs, outputs, and 
outcomes) of the subsidised projects.  
 
Findings: Our results show three tendencies about the bright/dark side of subsidies within the Mexican 
industry-university partnerships. The first tendency shows how collaborative behaviours positively 
influence intellectual capital dynamics within subsidised industry-university partnerships. The second 
tendency shows how opportunistic behaviours influence intellectual capital impacts (performance) and 
return to society (job creation). The third tendency shows how initial inputs of subsidised projects 
generate some expected socio-economic returns that pursued the subsidies (mediation effect of 
intellectual capital outputs).  
  
Research limitations/implications: This research has three limitations that provide a future research 
agenda. The main limitations were associated with our sources of information. The first limitation, we 
did not match subsidised partnerships (focus group) and non-subsidised partnerships (control group). A 
qualitative analysis should help understand the effect of subsidies on intellectual capital and 
partnerships’ behaviours. The second limitation, our measures of collaborative/opportunistic behaviours 
as well as intellectual capital dynamics should be improved by balancing traditional and new metrics in 
future research. The third limitation is that in emerging economies, the quality of institutions could 
influence the submission/selection of subsidies and generate negative externalities. Future research 
should control by geographical dispersion and co-location of subsidies.  
 
Practical implications: For enterprise managers, this study offers insights into IC dynamics and 
behaviours within subsidised industry-university partnerships. The bright side of collaboration 
behaviours is related to IC’s positive impacts on performance and socio-economic returns. The dark side 
is the IC appropriation behind opportunistic behaviours. Enterprise managers should recognise the 
relevance of IC management to capture value and reduce costs associated with opportunistic behaviours. 
For the university community, this study offers potential trends adopted by industry-university 
partnerships to reinforce universities’ innovative transformation processes. Specifically, these trends are 
related to the legitimisation of the university’s role in society and contribution to regional development 
through industry-university partnerships’ outcomes. Therefore, university managers should recognise 
the IC benefits/challenges behind industry-university partnerships. 
  
Social implications: For policymakers, the study indirectly shows the role of subsidies for 
generating/reinforcing intellectual capital outcomes within subsidised industry-university partnerships. 
The bright side allows evaluating the cost-benefit of this government intervention and the returns to 
priority industries. The dark side allows for understanding the need for implementing mechanisms to 
control opportunistic behaviours within subsidised partnerships. Accordingly, policymakers should 
understand the IC opportunity-costs related to industry-university partnerships for achieving the 
subsidies’ aims. 
 
Originality/value: This study contributes to three ongoing academic debates in innovation and 
management fields. The first debate about how intellectual capital dynamic is stimulated and transferred 
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through the collaborative behaviour within industry-university partnerships in emerging economies. The 
second debate is about the “dark side” of partnerships stimulated by public programmes in emerging 
economies. The third debate is about the effectiveness of subsidies on intellectual capital 
activities/outcomes. 
 
KEYWORDS: Intellectual Capital; Subsidies; Industry-university Partnerships; Collaborative-
Opportunistic behaviours; Emerging economies 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Over the last three decades, researchers have paid great attention to intellectual capital (IC) as the 
primary source for sustainable competitive advantages (Roos and Ross, 1997; Dabić et al., 2021). 
Specifically, extant studies have associated this complex concept with organizations’ intangible 
components and creating wealth (Stewart, 1997; Ponzi, 2002; Manzari et al., 2012; Ullberg et al., 2021). 
Intellectual capital embraces intangible resources and capabilities to create value-added (Stewart, 1997;  
Kianto et al., 2017). Although IC is strongly related to the appropriation of capabilities, competencies, 
and experiences that pursue long-term competitive advantages (Yitmen, 2011), the accumulated 
literature shows the lack of an explicit focus on IC and innovation partnerships (Ponzi, 2002; Manzari 
et al., 2012; Cuozzo et al., 2017). The IC’s antecedents and consequences are strongly related to the 
following three ongoing academic debates.  
 
The first academic debate has highlighted the need for IC and innovation studies (Ponzi, 2002; Manzari 
et al., 2012; Cuozzo et al., 2017). Although industry-university partnerships are effective sources of 
intellectual capital and value-creation, the lack of studies is associated with the non-existence of 
measures capturing traditional intellectual capital metrics through official datasets or via the information 
generated by subsidised university-industry partnerships. IC’s accumulated literature has shown the 
need for consensus in metrics and categories (Cuozzo et al., 2017). In this regard, Dumay (2009) and 
Dumay and Edvinsson (2013) have recommended adopting a critical approach for measuring intellectual 
capital, given its complexity and difficulty. Similarly, the link between innovation and the intellectual 
capital dynamics (inputs→outputs→outcomes) remains under-researched (Perkmann and Walsh, 2007; 
Senge and Forrester, 1980). Previous studies have shown the positive effect of intellectual capital among 
networks on performance and competitiveness (Solitander and Tidström, 2010; Kamukama et al., 2011; 
Bontis et al., 2018). However, little is known about the dynamic transformation process of intellectual 
capital. In this assumption,  intellectual capital represents a dynamic component that involves the 
transformation process of several IC inputs (human capital, relational, organizational…) into the 
expected intellectual capital outputs (products, services). Subsequently, the value-creation of these 
intellectual capital outputs will produce multiple IC outcomes/returns to organisations (performance, 
competitiveness) and society (wealth, employment).  
 
The second academic debate has justified R&D subsidies with the idea of market failures (i.e., financial 
constraints, uncertainties, risk aversion, and dynamic externalities) that further reduce private R&D 
investment (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962; Choi and Lee, 2017). According to Clarysse et al. (2009, p. 
1517), market failures are caused by leakages and spill-overs, which prevent the private sector that 
undertakes innovative activities from fully capturing the benefits of their investments. In this view, as 
ventures are not incentivized to invest, the government should intervene to compensate the private 
underinvestment through different policy instruments to promote intellectual capital and innovation 
(García-Quevedo, 2004; Clarysse et al. 2009; Edler and James, 2015; Dimos and Pugh, 2016; 
Kochenkova et al., 2016; Torres-Bareto et al., 2016). Specifically, in emerging economies, subsidies 
have gained pre-eminence in public policy and have been the central topic in the competitiveness agenda 
of the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the Organization of American States 
(Hall and Maffioli, 2008). It explains why policymakers have instituted industry-university partnerships 
through subsidies as a strategy to stimulate innovation, intellectual capital, and economic development 
(Cohen et al., 2002; Mahmood and Rufin, 2005; Takalo and Tanayama, 2010; Guo and Guo, 2011; 
Guerrero and Urbano, 2016). We assume that R&D subsidies/incentives oriented to industrial-university 
partnerships (Perkmann and Walsh, 2007; Guerrero et al., 2019a; Serino et al., 2020) are relevant 
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antecedents of intellectual capital components. Although the market failure theory justifies R&D 
subsidies, the major concern is that the theory is not very clear on whether the government can identify 
R&D projects that are subject to market failure (Choi and Lee, 2017, p. 1465), as well as the imperfection 
of resource allocations (Love, 1995, p. 399). 
 
The third academic debate has questioned the effectiveness of subsidies to industry-university 
partnerships (Zeng et al., 2010; Kovacs et al., 2015), especially in emerging economies (Hall et al., 
2016; Beltramino et al., 2021). Extant studies have explained that market resource allocation for R&D 
subsidies is not socially optimal because information asymmetry and opportunism make information in 
markets imperfect (Arrow, 1962). Transaction cost theorists have generally neglected to consider the 
implications that there is an invisible hand of the market mechanism for the risk of opportunism (Hill, 
1990). Institutional economic theorists have associated this effect with the lack of institutions’ quality 
(Guerrero et al., 2019a, b). Assuming that the government does not have the mechanism to identify 
behaviours within subsidised projects, opportunistic behaviour could appear when subsidies are 
perceived as the perfect substitute of the financial contribution that one or more partners should provide 
within a research project (Wallsten, 2000; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007). Previous studies have 
associated this effect to crowding-out effects that allow stopping to spend funds during the subsidised 
years of a project because subsidies are enough to continue ongoing the planned R&D activities (Dimos 
and Pugh, 2016). In this sense, the crowding out effect may come from innovation strategies based on 
external funds for developing R&D activities (Fölster, 1995; Irwin and Klenow, 1996). These practices 
encompass moral hazard problems when one partner attempts to be more competitive, appropriating its 
partners’ resources/capabilities for its benefit (Frishammar et al., 2015). Simultaneously, opportunistic 
partners take advantage of market failures, weak institutions, and asymmetries of information for 
obtaining resources/funds from several public programmes and external partners (Conner and Prahalad, 
1996). Therefore, little is known about how subsidies enhance both collaborative and opportunistic 
behaviours within subsidised industry-university partnerships (Gianiodis et al., 2016; Guerrero et al., 
2019a), and how partners’ behaviours influence the intellectual capital dynamics within subsidised 
industry-university (Pedro et al., 2018; Sanchez et al., 2009).  
 
Inspired by these two academic debates, this paper analyses how collaborative and opportunistic 
behaviours within industry-university partnerships influence the subsidised project’s intellectual capital 
dynamics (inputs, outputs, and outcomes). Theoretically, we proposed a conceptual model tested in an 
emerging economy (Mexico). We selected this emerging economy for two reasons: (a) from 2009 to 
2016, the Mexican administrations have been implemented subsidies to reinforce intellectual capital, 
innovation, and knowledge transfer through industry-university partnerships (OECD, 2013), and (b) 
Mexican ventures and universities have adopted open innovation practices to share costs, risk and 
intellectual capitals (Guerrero and Urbano, 2016). Empirically, we designed a two-step mixed 
methodology. In the first step, we tested our model using data from 683 Mexican subsidised industry-
university partnerships by Incentive Program for Innovation from CONACYT (Clarysse et al., 2009). 
In the second step, we analyse the effect of behaviours in intellectual capital dynamics (Pedro et al., 
2018; Sanchez et al., 2009).  
 
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we propose our conceptual framework; in section 3, we 
describe the methodological design used in this paper; in section 4, we show and discuss our findings; 
and in section 5, we show the main conclusions of the study, the implications for various stakeholders, 
and research agenda. 
 
 
2. SUBSIDIES, BEHAVIORS, AND INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL DYNAMICS  
 
2.1. Theoretical foundations  
 
In a recent literature review (Manzari et al., 2012, p. 2257), IC is considered as an intangible asset that 
is closely related to intellectual materials (knowledge, experiences, expertise, property) that are 
appropriated through internal or external collaborative innovation processes to offer better opportunities 
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for an organization to succeed in social and economic terms. In this study, IC is understood as intangible 
capabilities, competencies, and experiences used by organisations or partnerships to create/transfer 
knowledge, wealth, or value-added (Stewart, 1997; Edvinsson, 2002; Ponzi, 2002; Kianto et al., 2017; 
Ullberg et al., 2021). By adopting a subsided industry-university perspective, IC inputs are related to the 
appropriateness of capabilities, competencies, and experiences as a result of routines, flows of 
information, or knowledge transfer processes among partners (Carayannis et al., 2017; Del Giudice et 
al., 2013; Scuotto et al., 2017; Serino et al., 2020).  
 
Industry-university partnerships are effective sources of intellectual capital and value-creation within 
innovation processes (Perkmann and Walsh, 2007; Cuozzo et al., 2017). In this sense, the intellectual 
capital dynamics represents a dynamic process (inputs→outputs→outcomes) in which the intellectual 
capital inputs contributed by industry-university partners (competencies, capabilities, and expertise) will 
be transformed into innovation outputs (products, services, and process) and technology transfer outputs 
(patents, utility models), then will generate value-added to partnership (performance) and returns to 
society (spillover effects and employment).  
 
However, as individuals integrate industry-university partnerships, the intellectual capital dynamics 
(inputs→outputs→outcomes) will be positively/negatively influence their behaviours (Das et al., 2003; 
Guerrero et al., 2019b). According to Williamson (1975), opportunistic behaviours are responsible for 
the organisational failure and constitute a lack of honesty within cooperation/collaboration (Williamson, 
1987; Hill, 1990; Wilding and Humphries, 2006; Lui et al., 2009). Specifically, opportunist behaviours 
also affect the operational effectiveness and intellectual capital dynamics by the multiple controls 
implemented to reduce them (Das and Teng, 2001; Brachos et al., 2007; Kovacs et al., 2015; Dezi et al., 
2019b; Guerrero et al., 2019b).  
 
Based on these theoretical foundations, this study expects to understand IC’s contribution as a dynamic 




Subsidies allow industry-university partners access to public funds with a relatively lower cost than 
other alternative funding sources (Aschhoff, 2009; Aschhoff and Sofka, 2009). In this view, subsidies 
engage open innovation practices, reduce fixed-costs and increase the probability of achieving the R&D 
goals (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough et al., 2018; Nieto and Santamaría, 2007; Benavente et al., 2007; 
Guerrero and Urbano, 2016). A recent meta-regression analysis has evaluated the effects of subsidies 
on industry-university partnerships (Dimos and Pugh, 2016). This meta-analysis also helps to 
understand the intellectual capital dynamics and collaborative/opportunistic behaviours within 
subsidised university-industry (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007; Wallsten, 2000).  
 
Collaborative behaviours represent an opportunity for sharing intangible elements like know-how, 
competencies, capabilities for achieving the R&D goals (Carayannis et al., 2000; Whitley, 2002; Zeng 
et al., 2010; Guerrero and Urbano, 2019b). Based on crowding-out and additionality effects theoretical 
foundations, the collaborative rationality considers subsidy as additional financial support instead of 
substituting partners’ investments (Dimos and Pugh, 2016). In this rationality, collaborative behaviours 
within industry-university reduce costs because based on trust, partners share their intellectual capital 
inputs that will ensure the expected intellectual capital outputs (Buisseret et al., 1995; Autio et al., 2008; 
Clarysse et al., 2009). It produces a signalling effect about the quality of the project/team, the absence 
of information asymmetries, and the flow of intellectual capital among partners (Lerner, 1999). In 
contrast, opportunistic behaviours represent an opportunity to appropriate partners’ intellectual capital 
while the subsidised projects are continuing ongoing (Dimos and Pugh, 2016). As a result, opportunistic 
behaviours generate biased intellectual capital inputs and outputs among the university-industry partners 
(Fölster, 1995; Irwin and Klenow, 1996; Chen et al., 2002). It happens when opportunistic partners 
reduce failure/risks by substituting their investment or intellectual capital contributions through other 




By assuming the existence of partners’ behaviours within subsided university-industry partnerships, we 
assume that opportunistic behaviours will be more successful in the flow of intellectual capital inputs 
(expertise, capabilities, competencies, know-how) required in R&D projects, and consequently, these 
projects will be more likely to obtain better intellectual capital outputs (innovation and technological 
results) than collaborative partners. We assume that opportunistic partners will take advantage of market 
failures, weak institutions, and asymmetries of information to appropriate partners’ intellectual capital 
inputs (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Therefore, collaborative parents will be more likely to share their 
intellectual capital with their partners and looking for public funds for ensuring the project’s success. 
Intuitively, the partnership may capture more intellectual capital to ensure the success of its projects. 
Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis (inputs→outputs).  
 
H1a: Intellectual capital inputs (expertise, capabilities, competencies) have a positive 
effect in the R&D project to achieving the expected intellectual capital outputs (innovation 
and technology).  
H1b: University-Industry partners’ behaviours moderate the positive flow of intellectual 
capital inputs (expertise, capabilities, competencies) needed in the R&D project to 
achieving the expected intellectual capital outputs (innovation and technology).  
 
The public funds’ intrinsic purpose is to generate positive returns for university-industry partnerships 
(innovation performance) and society (generation of employment) (Belderbos et al., 2004). We assume 
that the intellectual capital flow among subsidised university-industry partnerships (intellectual capital 
inputs) transformed into innovations and technologies (intellectual capital outputs) help to achieve 
partnership’s performance as well as to generate returns to society (intellectual capital outcomes). 
Previous studies have shown that the university-industry partnership’s performance is related to the 
capture of value-added through revenues (Trigo and Vence, 2012) and retribution of using public funds 
through job creation and spillover effects (Hill, 1990; Bogers, 2011; Salmi, 2012).  
 
We assume that collaborative behaviours will generate more positive effects on intellectual capital 
outcomes than opportunistic behaviours (Li and Kozhikode, 2009; Dimos and Pugh, 2016). The 
plausible explanation is that the reasoning of collaborative behaviour is producing intellectual capital 
sharing effects to generate benefits for society (Bogers, 2011). In contrast, opportunistic behaviours are 
based on moral hazard problems that generate instability and transactional costs (Williamson, 1987; 
Sutz, 2000; Klerkx and Aarts, 2013; Bäck and Kohtamäki, 2015; Torres-Bareto et al., 2016). Instability 
and costs outweigh the outcomes generated by intellectual capital within the collaboration (Hottenrott 
and Lopes-Bento, 2016). At the partnership level, opportunistic behaviours will produce positive 
intellectual capital outcomes in the short-term, but the associated opportunistic-costs will reduce the 
long-term positive effects (Söderblom and Samuelsson, 2013). At the societal level, the opportunistic 
partnership’s economic return to society will be more limited and lower than collaborative partnerships. 
Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis (outputs→outcomes).  
 
H2a: Intellectual capital outputs (innovation and technology) has a positive effect on the 
partnership (innovation performance) and the society (generation of employment or 
industrial spillovers)  
H2a: University-Industry partners’ behaviours moderate the positive returns of intellectual 
capital outputs (innovation and technology) into the partnership (innovation performance) 
and the society (generation of employment or industrial spillovers)  
 
Neither theoretically nor empirically, there are a few insights about the effectiveness of subsidies in 
stimulating intellectual capital and resulting in significant intellectual capital outcomes (Clarysse et al., 
2009; Greco et al., 2016; Hall et al., 2016). By assuming the intellectual capital dynamics view 
(inputs→outputs→outcomes), we argue that the intellectual capital inputs (experience, capabilities, 
competencies) shared among the subsided university-industry partnership have contributed to achieving 
intellectual capital outcomes (performance and society returns) through the generation of intellectual 
capital outputs (innovations and technologies) (Solitander and Tidström, 2010; Kamukama et al., 2011; 




In this sense, proponents of subsidies justify the importance of subsidies that promote the flow of 
intellectual capital among university-industry partnerships (García-Quevedo, 2004; Dimos and Pugh, 
2016). In contrast, opponents of subsidies could argue asymmetries of information (Callahan et al., 
2012) or opportunistic behaviours (Sissoko, 2011; Hall et al., 2016) among university-partnerships and 
governments. In this regard, it is possible to identify the effectiveness of subsidies exploring the 
mediation effect of intellectual capital outputs on the relationship between intellectual capital inputs and 
intellectual capital outcomes (Obeidat et al., 2017).  
 
By assuming a mediation effect, it is possible to identify the direct and indirect contribution to the 
subsidy’s intellectual capital outcomes via intellectual capital inputs and intellectual capital outputs. 
Therefore, this insight is aligned with the primary purpose of the subsidy that is impacting intellectual 
capital results (products, services, process, patents, licenses) by generating a better venture performance 
(sales, exports, revenues) and good returns to the society (job creation, spillovers). The absorptive 
capacity of intellectual capital among collaborative modes is strongly related to organizational outcomes 
(Bontis et al., 2018; Santoro et al., 2018) and productive outcomes in the region (Kamukama et al., 2011; 
Nicotra et al., 2018). Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis 
(inputs→outputs→outcomes).  
 
H3a: Intellectual capital outputs (innovation and technology) has a positive mediating 
effect on the flow of intellectual capital inputs (expertise, capabilities, competencies) 
needed to achieve the R&D expected intellectual capital outcomes (innovation 
performance, social returns) 
H3b: University-Industry partners’ behaviours moderate the positive mediating effect that 
exerts intellectual capital outputs (innovation and technology) into the flow of intellectual 
capital inputs (expertise, capabilities, competencies) needed to achieve the R&D expected 
intellectual capital outcomes (innovation performance, social returns) 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual proposed model. 
 




3.1. The Mexican Incentive Programme for Innovation 
 
The Mexican government enacted the Science and Technology Law to foster scientific research, 
technological development, and innovation in 2002. The National Council for Science and Technology 
(CONACYT) is the main body responsible for defining, developing, and implementing the law (Diario 
Oficial, 2014).  From 2009 to 2016, Mexico implemented the Incentive Programme for Innovation with 
an investment of 2932 million dollars (Guerrero et al., 2019a, 2019b) that support innovative ventures 
registered at the National Register of Institutions and Scientific and Technological Ventures 
(RENIECYT). In this vein, the projects’ submitters were Mexican ventures on behalf of the industry-
university partnership.  
 
The Incentive Programme for Innovation programme aims to encourage growth, competitiveness, 
linking enterprise and scientific organizations to incorporate specialized human capital, generate 
innovations with value-added to strategic sectors, and contribute to the creation/protection of intellectual 
property.  In particular, the innovation programme included three modalities: INNOVAPYME oriented 
to promote projects developed by SMEs both individually or in collaboration with universities/research 
centres; INNOVATEC oriented to promote projects developed by large ventures both individually 
or/and in collaboration with a university/research centre, and PROINNOVA oriented to promote 
projects developed in collaboration with at least two universities or two research centres. Therefore, our 
analysis unit was the subsided projects submitted by Mexican ventures in collaboration with Mexican 




--- Insert Table I ---- 
 
3.2 Data collection  
 
The empirical analysis uses an original, unexploited, and novel dataset combining two sources of 
information collected by CONACYT from 2009 to 2016 related to the Incentive Programme for an 
Innovation programme.  
 
The first source was the intellectual inputs dataset. The CONACYT collected this data during the 
submission process of the three public modalities (INNOVAPYME, INNOVATEC, and PROINNOVA) 
of the Incentive Programme for Innovation programme. The dataset contained information1 about 3817 
subsided applications and 9451 non-subsided applications (Table I). In this regards, the study focused 
on subsided partnerships because this dataset provides additional information about ventures (size, 
sector, sub-sector, location), the collaborations with scientific and commercial organizations, the 
individual subsidies, and the investment per application (total amount, % reported by private sources – 
investment per partner-, % reported by public sources – subsidy-).  
 
The second source was the intellectual outputs/outcomes dataset. The CONACYT collected this data at 
the end of the subsided projects. The dataset provides information about intellectual capital outputs in 
terms of innovation in products, services, processes, patents, licenses, dissertations, as well as 
intellectual capital outcomes in terms of sales, reduction of costs, revenues, job creation, and trained 
employees. The information was collected through a survey at different stages of the project – pre, 
during, and post-. By reviewing the partners’ IDs, we identified a panel of 683 Mexican ventures related 
to 2140 subsidies projects in our period of analysis. It means that Mexican ventures submitted more than 
one project on behalf of the subsided partnership (industry-university) during the analysis period. 
Therefore, we used the accumulative and lagged amounts per subsided partnership.   
 
3.2.1 Description of variables   
 
Our metrics are based on considering IC as a dynamic process (inputs→outputs→outcomes) and not 
static. Any intellectual capital needs to be transformed into outputs and outcomes. Inside organisations 
or partnerships, the sharing and flow of intellectual capital are converted into tangible elements 
(products, services, diversification practices, and others) that will impact performance. This study only 
translated this reasoning into the analysed phenomenon. Table II summarizes the set of variables 
included in the analysis.   
 
--- Insert Table II ---- 
 
Partnership behaviours were measured using a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the subsidised 
venture showed an opportunistic behaviour, and value 0 when the subsidised venture showed a 
collaborative behaviour. By following Dimos and Pugh’s (2016) meta-analysis, we identified diverse 
effects related to subsidies’ effectiveness. Concretely, we reviewed the contribution of each venture to 
each subsidised project. An opportunistic behaviour was observed when the subsidised partners 
contribute less than the total amount indicated in the submitted proposal. It represents that the subsidised 
partners financed the projects using external money from subsidies or partners (Osterloh and Frey, 2000; 
Söderblom et al., 2015; Dimos and Pugh, 2016). A collaborative behaviour was identified when the 
partner financed the total amount indicated in the initial proposal. This behaviour is intrinsically 
 
1 Information included the ID application, the application year, description of projects, modality of the public 
programme, general characteristics about the partnership (venture and university or research centres). However, 
by confidential agreements, we faced restrictive access to specific details to identify industrial partner. Based on 
this limitation, an analysis with the follow-up and the matching of non-subsidized partner with subsidized partners 
were not possible. 
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motivated by looking for public funds to set up the subsidised partnership (Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; 
Clarysse et al., 2009; Dimos and Pugh, 2016).  
 
Intellectual capital inputs were measured using a set of three variables. First, the capabilities measured 
by the number of collaborations with (scientific t0 and commercial t0) partners, as suggested by Belderbos 
et al. (2004). Second, experience regarding the scale and time of previous collaborations (Guerrero et 
al., 2019a, 2019b). Third, competencies measured by the number of venture’s trained employees 
enrolled in subsidised collaborations (Busom and Fernandez Ribas, 2008). Being involved in multiple 
collaborations with scientific or commercial parents/agents brings researchers the know-how, 
competencies, capabilities, and learning that could be considered part of the human intellect (e.g., a 
more specialized human capital). As many collaborators and involved in multiple projects, the 
intangibles or know-how will be higher and creativity emerges for generating value (Bellini et al., 2019; 
Schwartz et al., 2012; Ullberg et al., 2021). Indeed, previous studies have measured human capital 
through the experience captured in the number of years and linking them with success (Unger et al., 
2011). Therefore, we assume that a subsidized university-industry partnership requires experience in 
managing them. More concretely, if the partner has been enrolled in many subsidized projects for a long 
time, the partner gains the experience, know-how, and relational capital required in R&D projects 
(Schwartz et al., 2012).  
 
Intellectual capital outputs were measured using a set of six types of innovation and technology transfer 
results (Torres-Barreto et al., 2016; Guerrero et al., 2019a, 2019b). First, the number of new products 
obtained at the end of the project concerning the expected products indicated in the initial proposal  (new 
products tn-t0). Second, the number of new services obtained at the end of the project concerning the 
expected services indicated in the initial proposal (new services tn-t0). Third, the number of new 
processes obtained at the end of the project concerning the initial proposal’s expected process (new 
processes tn-t0). Four, the number of new patents obtained at the end of the project concerning the 
expected patents indicated in the initial proposal (new patents tn-t0). Five, the number of utility models 
obtained at the end of the project concerning the expected utility models indicated in the initial proposal 
(new utility models tn-t0). Six, the number of dissertations obtained at the end of the project concerning 
the number of dissertations indicated in the initial proposal (new dissertations tn-t0). Previous IC studies 
have measured intellectual capital’s effects on innovations using product/process innovation scales 
(Elsetouhi et al., 2015; Subramaniam and Youndt, 2005). In this study, we use objective measures that 
capture the number of innovations and technologies in the context of university-industry partnerships 
(Torres-Barreto et al., 2016; Guerrero et al., 2019a, 2019b).  
 
Intellectual capital outcomes were measured using a set of six outcomes based on previous studies 
(Audretsch and Feldman 1996; García-Quevedo, 2004; Söderblom et al., 2015; Dimos and Pugh, 2016; 
Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento, 2016; Bellucci et al., 2018). First, the natural logarithm of sales generated 
at the end of the project respect the expected sales indicated in the proposal (LnSales tn-t0). Second, the 
natural logarithm of revenues generated at the end of the project concerning the expected revenues 
indicated in the proposal (LnRevenues tn-t0). Third, the natural logarithm of exports generated at the end 
of the project concerning the expected exports indicated in the proposal (LnExports tn-t0). Four, the 
number of new projects in diversified sectors concerning the sector indicated in the proposal (Spillover 
tn-t0). Five, the number of jobs generated at the end of the project respects the expected job indicated in 
the proposal (Employment tn-t0). Finally, several control variables are used to analyse the investment 
per partner, the number of projects, sector/industry, venture location, and venture size. The intellectual 
capital literature has evidenced the positive contribution of intellectual capital on organizational 
performance (Bontis et al., 2018) as well as on the competitive advantage (Kamukama et al., 2011) 
generated in value-creating networks (Solitander and Tidström, 2010). Following these insights, IC 
outcomes’ metrics capture the expected outcomes at organisational level (performance measured 
through sales, revenues, and exports). We complemented the set of metrics by including the potential 
returns of society associated with the university-industry partnerships’ intellectual capital. It is related 





3.3. Data analysis  
The subsidies have been analysed using diverse econometric models (Dimos and Pugh, 2016: pp. 812-
813). Given the complexity of the role of behaviours on intellectual capital dynamics, some authors 
employed instrumental variables estimations, including the simultaneous equation system (Aerts and 
Schmidt, 2008; Obeidat et al., 2017). In this regard, this study adopted the structural equation modelling 
(SEM) to analyse the simultaneous relationships proposed in the conceptual model (Figure 1). This 
statistical technique has been widely used in behavioural sciences (Shook et al., 2004). This technique 
allows examining a set of relationships between one or more independent or dependent variables, either 
continuous or discrete (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996). Also, this technique allows seeing the weight of 
each variable, and therefore the direct and indirect contribution, to explain the relationship among the 
constructs and testing potential mediation effects (Fox, 1980; Sobel, 1982; Cheung and Lau, 2008). We 
did the reliability and validity tests (see appendixes A1 and A2). The test showed acceptable parameters 
between 0.6 and 0.7. Additionally, we tested the correlation between constructs. Our conceptual model 
was tested using the entire sample (Model I) and splitting the sample by opportunistic behaviours (Model 
IIa) and by collaborative behaviours (Model IIb).  
 
4.  FINDINGS  
 
Table III shows the IC dynamic results. All models showed good fits (Shook et al., 2004): the Chi-
square (2.50), the GFI (0.89), the CFI (0.87), and RSEA (0.50).  
 
Concerning the influence of behaviours on the positive influence of intellectual capital inputs and 
intellectual capital outputs (IC inputs→ IC outputs), Model I showed the positive contribution of 
intellectual capital inputs on intellectual capital outputs [0.725; p<0.001]. These results support H1a. It 
means that the shared experiences, capabilities, and competencies among subsidised university-industry 
partners have been successfully converted into innovations and technologies. Our results showed that 
incorporating trained employees generates the highest contribution t0 [8.466; p<0.100] in developing 
innovative/technological outputs followed by scientific partners capabilities t0 [1.907; p<0.001]. Model 
II also showed that both opportunistic behaviours [0.744; p<0.001] and collaborative behaviours [0.532; 
p<0.001] reinforced this relationship. These results support H1b. 
 
Concerning the influence of behaviours on the positive influence of intellectual capital outputs and 
intellectual capital outcomes (IC outputs → IC outcomes), Model I showed the positive effect of 
intellectual capital outputs on intellectual capital outcomes [1.687; p<0.001]. It means that the 
subsidised university-industry partners’ innovations in new products tn-t0 [10.731; p<0.001] and new 
services tn-t0 [2.954; p<0.001] have created significant value for partners [1.742; p<0.001] and society 
[11.586; p<0.001]. These result support H1a. Model II also showed that both opportunistic behaviours 
[1.470; p<0.100] and collaborative behaviours [1.131; p<0.100] reinforced this relationship. In the case 
of opportunistic partners, the generation of new products [15.452; p<0.001] has generated the highest 
contributions via sales [2.338; p<0.001] and revenues [1.908; p<0.001]. In the case of collaborative 
partners, the generation of new patents [1.573; p<0.001] and dissertations [2.218; p<0.001] have 
generated the highest contributions for partners’ performance. It means that opportunistic ventures 
(model IIb) have the highest effect on sales, revenues, and exports than collaborative ventures (model 
IIa). In terms of social and economic returns, the results also showed the highest contribution of 
collaborative behaviours on job creation [14.446; p<0.001] than opportunistic behaviours [6.253 
p<0.100]. Moreover, the spillover effect in terms of an externality that creates more intensity/diversified 
sectors is generated by opportunistic behaviours [1.22; p<0.050]. These results support H2b. 
 
--- Insert Table III ---- 
 
Table IV shows the mediation effects. As a robustness test, this mediation test helped to show the 
patterns observed when tested H1a and H2b. Concerning the specifications, the models showed a good 
fit according to the established patterns (Shook et al., 2004):  the Chi-square (2.50), the GFI (0.89), the 




Concerning the influence of behaviours on the mediation role of intellectual capital inputs on 
intellectual capital outcomes (IC inputs→ IC outputs → IC outcomes), Model I showed a similar 
positive direct effect [0.651; p<0.05] and indirect effect [0.615; p<0.05] of intellectual capital inputs on 
intellectual capital outcomes. These results support H3a. It represents the contribution of innovations 
and technologies developed by the university-industry partnership. Model II also showed the direct 
effect of opportunistic behaviours [0.682; p<0.050] and collaborative behaviours [0.518; p<0.100]. In 
this regard, both types of behaviours reinforce the contribution and mediation effect of IC outputs. 
However, the indirect impact of IC inputs generate on IC outcomes through IC outputs is higher for 
opportunistic behaviours [0.434; p<0.050] than collaborative ones [0.125; p<0.100]. It means that new 
products generated by opportunistic behaviour [6.229; p<0.100] have indirectly impacted sales [0.755; 
p<0.001] and job creation [2.381; p<0.001]. Indeed, the new products generated by collaborative 
behaviours [3.928; p<0.100] have indirectly impacted sales [0.601; p<0.001] and job creation [9.055; 
p<0.001].  These results support H3b. 
 
--- Insert Table IV ---- 
 
5.  DISCUSSION 
 
Our results support the positive influence of behaviours on IC inputs and IC outputs. Concretely, we 
observe that, while opportunistic behaviours that take advantage through the appropriation of external 
resources and capabilities in the development of innovations/technologies (Fölster, 1995; Conner and 
Prahalad, 1996; Chen et al., 2002; Dimos and Pugh, 2016), collaborative behaviours shared their 
investment and trained employees that combined with scientific partner’s capabilities and subsidies 
development multiple innovations/technologies. In this view, collaborative behaviours allow scaling 
projects and capture value-added within venture-university partnerships (Buisseret et al., 1995; Lerner, 
1999; Clarysse et al., 2009; Dimos and Pugh, 2016).  
 
Results support our assumption about the positive influence of IC outputs on IC outcomes. Particularly, 
collaborative behaviours have generated the highest socio-economic returns through job creation. 
Similar to previous studies, collaborative behaviours are positively influenced by initial goals and the 
expected returns to society (Hill, 1990; Bogers, 2011; Salmi, 2012). Also, opportunistic behaviours 
generated the highest spillover impacts. A plausible explanation is that they exploit the opportunities via 
subsidised university-industry projects (Acs et al., 2009). However, opportunistic behaviours generate 
positive IC outcomes in the short-term. Any reduction of subsidies or external funds could affect 
projects’ sustainability (Söderblom and Samuelsson, 2013). Opportunistic behaviours are motivated by 
creating value without thinking about returns to society (Sutz, 2000; Klerkx and Aarts, 2013; Hottenrott 
and Lopes-Bento, 2016).  
 
Our results support our arguments about the mediation role of intellectual capital inputs. Directly and 
indirectly, the Mexican subsidies have positive and significant impacts on intellectual capital outputs 
and intellectual capital outcomes (Dimos and Pugh, 2016). The study provides several insights about 
the IC dynamics (IC inputs→ IC outputs → IC outcomes) within the R&D process of subsided 
university-industry partnerships. In this sense, our study contributes to the IC literature by evidencing 
the relationship between IC and innovation (Ponzi, 2002; Manzari et al., 2012; Cuozzo et al., 2017), as 
well as the positive effects of IC dynamics on performance and competitiveness (Solitander and 





6.1. Conclusions   
 
This paper analysed how collaborative and opportunistic behaviours within industry-university 
partnerships influence the subsidised projects’ intellectual capital dynamics (IC inputs→ IC outputs → 
IC outcomes). We tested our proposed model with a sample of  683 Mexican subsidised industry-
12 
 
university partnerships from 2009 to 2016. Three main conclusions emerge from our results. First, the 
effect of intellectual capital inputs (trained employees’ capacities and scientific partner’s capabilities) 
on intellectual capital outputs (innovation and technology transfer) is reinforced by collaborative 
behaviours within subsidised industry-university partnerships. We extended the academic debate about 
how public programmes through collaborative industry-university partnerships can stimulate 
intellectual capital dynamics in emerging economies (Roos and Ross, 1997; Das et al., 2003; Hall et al., 
2016; Kianto et al., 2017; Guerrero et al., 2019a, 2019b), as well as the role of intellectual capital 
dynamics in innovation processes (Ponzi, 2002; Manzari et al., 2012; Cuozzo et al., 2017; Dabić et al., 
2021). Second, opportunistic behaviours showed a stronger influence on intellectual capital outcomes 
than collaborative behaviours. Opportunistic partners focused on exploiting external resources (private 
and public) for generating higher performance (sales, revenues, exports) but with lower socio-economic 
return (lower rate of new employment). We extended the academic debate about the “dark side” of 
partnerships stimulated by public programmes in emerging economies by highlighting how 
opportunistic partners capture benefits of subsidies without generating any societal returns (Chen, 2004; 
Chen et al., 2014; Dimos and Pugh, 2016; Xie et al., 2016). Third, intellectual capital outputs exert a 
mediation effect in the relationship between inputs and outcomes. It means that, directly or indirectly, 
the initial inputs of subsidised projects generate the expected returns that pursued the incentive 
programme. In this vein, although we are not evaluating the effectiveness of subsidies, our insights 
contribute to the debate about the effectiveness of subsidies on private/collaborative intellectual capital 
activities/outcomes (Dimos and Pugh, 2016; Greco et al., 2016; Hall et al., 2016; Obeidat et al., 2017; 
Pedro et al., 2018).  
 
6.2. Limitations and future research agenda   
 
This research has some limitations that provide a future research agenda. The first limitation is associated 
with the academics’ criticisms related to the “unconventional” IC definition and metrics.  This research 
represents an experiment that translates into intellectual capital dynamics reasoning. A proposed 
conceptual approach (and metrics) shows the flow or conversion of the intangible components (and 
behaviours) related to science-industry cooperation into IC inputs and outputs, and outcomes will impact 
performance. This study adopted a general definition of IC, indicates that it is related to “intangible” 
(e.g., Wyatt, 2008; Serrat, 2017; Ullberg et al., 2021) that are very complex and difficult to measure 
(Dumay, 2009). Within university-industry relationships, the proposed proxies of IC inputs represent 
the knowledge and know-how that can be used to achieve the collaboration goals and how these IC 
inputs experiment a dynamic process of conversion into outputs and outcomes. Future research should 
question our proposed metrics, as well as if the traditional way to measure IC should also be discussed 
and updated. The second limitation is associated with our dataset. We recognize the difficulty of 
matching with non-subsidised partnerships to contrast our results by the lack of information. We tried 
to solve this problem by exploring this match using multiple case studies of subsidised partnerships 
(focus group) and non-subsidised partnerships (control group). The natural extension extends the 
analysis about the effectiveness or contribution of subsidies in the dynamics of intellectual capital and 
explores the outcomes obtained by subsidised vs. non-subsidised partnerships (Guerrero and Urbano, 
2019a). The third limitation is related to collaborative/opportunistic behaviours and intellectual capital 
dynamism (inputs/outputs/outcomes). Our study followed the criterion to identify 
collaborative/opportunistic behaviours by using differences between the planned vs. real investments 
per partner. We believe that opportunistic/collaborative behaviours and intellectual capital dynamic 
measures are very complex. Our future research agenda includes new metrics that help us capture 
collaborative/opportunistic behaviours within subsidised projects or any innovation partnership 
(Gianiodis et al., 2016), and the intellectual capital dynamic metrics (Manzari et al., 2012; Cuozzo et 
al., 2017). Future studies should also explore the implementation of mixed measures (objective and 
subjective) to understand better the influence of behaviours on the contribution of intellectual capital 
inputs on partnerships’ outcomes. It also implies extending the analysis of control mechanisms by 
combining knowledge management and innovation (Del Giudice and Maggioni, 2014; Bornemann et 
al., 2021; Pawlowsky et al., 2021). The four limitation is related to the unit of analysis. Our dataset 
included subsidised projects of industry-university partnerships. However, the programme requirements 
demanded that the industry partner submitted the proposal. It explains why we controlled by the 
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partnership and industrial partner characteristics. In future research, industrial partners and research 
partners should be analysed to understand better their involvement in intellectual capital dynamics, 
subsidies, and behaviours (Chen et al., 2020). A balance between theory and practice should be 
considered in future studies. The lack of studies about dynamics and relationships among collaboration 
partnerships demands longitudinal analyses and robust conceptual approaches (evolutionary, 
contingency, or ambidexterity). The fifth limitation is related to contextual conditions. In emerging 
economies, the quality of institutions generates negative externalities (i.e., corruption, bribes). Almost 
30% of the subsidised partnerships were located in cities with higher corruption levels (Guerrero and 
Urbano, 2020). The location could influence the submission/selection process of grants, incentives, and 
subsidies. Future research should control by geographical dispersion and co-location of subsidies 
(Kafouros et al., 2018; Urbano et al., 2019). The lack of studies demands new conceptual frameworks 
to explore uncertain scenarios characterized by multiple institutional voids. Finally, intellectual capital 
literature also demands an update and review of the accumulated literature. It is hard to understand the 
absence of unique definitions that help to conduct and replicate research across levels of analysis and 
contexts (Manzari et al., 2012). Indeed, given the unexpected external events (e.g., COVID-19 
pandemic), future research should also consider the digitalisation into the relationship between IC 
intellectual and value co-creation process with other collectives like students (Magni et al., 2020, 2021), 
technology transfer from academics (Siegel and Guerrero, 2021), government (Johanson et al., 2006), 
ecosystem agents (Guerrero et al., 2020), supply chain (Mubarik et al., 2021); final users (Rossi and 
Magni, 2017), non-profit organisations (Blankenburg et al., 2018) and civil society 
 
6.3. Implications   
 
Several implications emerge from our study for stakeholders (policymakers, enterprise managers, and 
university managers) involved in the Mexican innovation and entrepreneurship ecosystems. For 
policymakers, the study provides insights into the effectiveness of IC dynamics, behaviours and 
subsidies. The bright side allows evaluating the cost-benefit of this government intervention and the 
effects on priority industries. On the dark side, as a part of the protectionist strategies, the current 
Mexican administration does not continue with substantial investments to reinforce intellectual capital 
within industry-university partnerships like previous administrations. Our results allow policymakers to 
understand the challenges and impacts of re-defining/re-incentivizing the different value-chain actors 
(Dussel et al., 2018; Takalo and Tanayama, 2010). Ex-post funding provides a strong incentive to 
produce measurable outputs (e.g., subsidised partnerships should be monitored). Ex-ante mechanisms 
could also help to control what (projects), who (behaviours), which (intellectual capital), why (expected 
outcomes) need to be subsided (Manzari et al., 2012; Guerrero et al., 2019a). For enterprise managers, 
this study offers IC dynamics and behaviours within subsidised industry-university partnerships. The 
bright side of collaboration behaviours is related to the positive impacts on intellectual capital 
performance and socio-economic returns. It opens the transformation of intellectual capital strategies 
oriented to the diversification into new sectors (i.e., knowledge, information, intellectual property, 
human capital experience, and relational) to create value-added (Kianto et al., 2017; Bosio et al., 2018).  
The dark side is the appropriation behaviours of partners. In this view, to capture the intellectual capital 
value in the long-term, the results provide insights into the relevance of a shared vision/goals and the 
trust for reducing opportunistic behaviours within partnerships (Söderblom and Samuelsson, 2013). For 
the university community, industry-university partnerships are useful for the innovative transformation 
process of universities. In this sense, open collaboration practices with diverse agents involved in the 
entrepreneurial and innovative ecosystem will be an excellent strategy to reinforce their core activities 
and develop intellectual capital capabilities in the region (Guerrero and Urbano, 2016; Guerrero et al., 
2019a,b). The outcomes are also relevant to legitimize their role in society and their contribution to 
regional development.  
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Table I. Number of supported and non-supported applications to the Incentive Programme for 
Innovation, 2009-2014  
Year 
INNOVAPYME INNOVATEC PROINNOVA 
Supported Non-supported Supported Non-supported Supported Non-supported 
2009 177 652 279 876 47 92 
2010 257 602 229 316 191 699 
2011 207 575 112 568 224 595 
2012 152 474 126 362 244 613 
2013 198 543 146 286 362 582 
2014 241 608 169 236 456 772 






Table II: Variables  
 
Construct Sub-construct Variable Measure Theoretical support 
Behaviors  
 
Opportunistic vs. Collaborative behavior t0 
Binary:  
(1) Opportunistic when the subsidized 
partners contribute with less than the total 
amount that was indicated in the 
submitted proposal.  
(0) Collaborative behavior when the 
when the subsidized partners financed the 
total amount indicated in the initial 
proposal.  
Clarysse et al., 
2009; Söderblom et 






Scientific partners t0 
Number of collaborations with 
universities and research centers enrolled 
in subsided projects indicated in the 
initial proposal 





2008;  Unger et al., 
2011; Schwartz et 
al., 2012; Guerrero 
et al., 2019b; 
Bellini et al., 2019; 
Commercial partners t0 
Number of collaborations with other 
firms  enrolled in the subsided projects 
indicated in the initial proposal 
Competences Trained employees t0 
Number of trained employees of the 
venture indicated in the initial proposal 
Experience 
R&D experience – scale Number of subsided projects  
R&D experience – time 






New products tn-t0 
Number of new products obtained at the 
end respect to the expected products 
indicated in the initial proposal   
Buisseret et al., 
1995; Belderbos et 
al., 2004; García-
Quevedo, 2004; 
Falk, 2007; Aerts 
and Schmidt, 2008; 
Busom and 
Fernandez Ribas, 
2008; Clarysse et 
al., 2009; Guerrero 
et al., 2019b 
New services tn-t0 
Number of new services obtained at the 
end respect to the expected services 
indicated in the initial proposal   
New processes tn-t0 
Number of new processes obtained at the 
end respect to the expected processes 
indicated in the initial proposal   
Technology 
transfer outputs 
New patents tn-t0 
Number of new patents obtained at the 
end respect to the expected patents 
indicated in the initial proposal   
New utility models tn-t0 
Number of new utility models obtained at 
the end respect to the expected utility 
models indicated in the initial proposal   
New dissertations tn-t0 
Number of new dissertations obtained at 
the end respect to the expected 
dissertations indicated in the initial 






Natural logarithm of sales generated at 
the end respect to the expected sales 
indicated in the initial proposal    
García-Quevedo, 
2004; Söderblom et 
al., 2015; Dimos 
and Pugh, 2016; 
Hottenrott and 
Lopes-Bento, 2016; 
Bellucci et al., 2018 
LnRevenue tn-t0 
Natural logarithm of revenues generated 
at the end respect to the expected revenue 
indicated in the initial proposal    
LnExports tn-t0 
Natural logarithm of exports generated at 
the end respect to the expected exports 
indicated in the initial proposal    
Return to society  
Spillovers tn-t0 
Number of new projects in diversified 
sectors respect to the sector indicated  in 
the initial proposal    
Employment tn-t0 
Number of new employment generated at 
the end respect to the expected new 
employment indicated in the initial 
proposal    





Table III: SEM regression weights [General test] 
 





 Coef.  S.E. P Coef.  S.E. P Coef.  S.E. P 
H1a Intellectual capital outputs <--- Intellectual capital inputs 0.725 0.139 *** 0.532 0.122 *** 0.744 0.196 *** 




R&D experience – scale <--- Intellectual capital inputs 0.694 0.049 *** 0.614 0.067 *** 0.537 0.053 *** 
R&D experience – time <--- Intellectual capital inputs 1.365 0.122 *** 0.890 0.171 *** 1.220 0.128 *** 
Scientific partners t0 <--- Intellectual capital inputs 1.907 0.470 *** 1.070 0.557 * 1.779 0.239 *** 
Commercial partners t0 <--- Intellectual capital inputs 1.082 0.610 * -0.194 1.118 
 1.724 0.303 *** 




New products tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outputs 10.731 2.575 *** 5.727 1.644 *** 15.452 5.026 ** 
New services tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outputs 2.954 0.659 *** 2.394 0.658 *** 2.631 0.916 ** 
New processes tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outputs 0.749 0.404 * 0.253 0.562 
 0.917 0.337 ** 
New patents tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outputs 1.598 0.381 *** 1.573 0.521 ** 1.213 0.271 *** 
New utility models tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outputs 1.626 0.149 *** 1.636 0.210 ** 1.825 0.184 *** 




LnSales tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outcomes 1.348 0.161 *** 1.101 0.215 *** 2.338 0.555 *** 
LnRevenue tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outcomes 1.742 0.089 *** 1.428 0.102 *** 1.908 0.177 *** 
LnExports tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outcomes 1.121 0.164 *** 0.986 0.303 ** 1.314 0.282 *** 
Spillovers tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outcomes 0.048 0.015 ** 0.028 0.018   0.122 0.047 ** 
Employment tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outcomes 11.586 2.053 *** 14.446 3.899 *** 6.253 2.457 * 
[Standardized estimates; CMIN/DF 2.50; GFI 0.889; CFI 0.872; RSEA 0.051] 





Table IV: SEM regression weights [Mediation test] 
 





 Coef.  S.E. P Coef.  S.E. P Coef.  S.E. P 
H1a Intellectual capital outputs <--- Intellectual capital inputs 0.704 0.136 *** 0.461 0.117 *** 0.706 0.194 *** 
H2a Intellectual capital outcomes <--- Intellectual capital outputs 0.875 0.344 ** 0.272 0.043 * 0.614 0.238 * 




Experience – scale <--- Intellectual capital inputs 0.694 0.049 *** 0.630 0.067 *** 0.538 0.053 *** 
Experience – time <--- Intellectual capital inputs 1.366 0.122 *** 0.940 0.172 *** 1.221 0.128 *** 
Scientific partners t0 <--- Intellectual capital inputs 1.914 0.469 *** 1.133 0.566 * 1.774 0.239 *** 
Commercial partners t0 <--- Intellectual capital inputs 1.082 0.608 * -0.134 1.132 
 1.719 0.303 *** 




New products tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outputs 10.416 2.479 *** 5.564 1.500 *** 13.667 5.085 ** 
New services tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outputs 3.035 0.660 *** 2.457 0.639 *** 2.666 0.980 ** 
New processes tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outputs 0.719 0.400 * 0.230 0.566 
 0.869 0.352 * 
New patents tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outputs 1.533 0.364 *** 1.323 0.448 ** 1.412 0.331 *** 
New utility models tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outputs 1.000 0.155 *** 1.000 0.256 ** 1.000 0.166 *** 




LnSales tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outcomes 1.329 0.161 *** 0.978 0.195 *** 2.773 0.902 ** 
LnRevenue tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outcomes 1.752 0.091 *** 1.022 0.204 *** 1.691 0.117 ** 
LnExports tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outcomes 1.113 0.165 *** 1.191 0.249 *** 1.271 0.493 * 
Spillovers tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outcomes 0.052 0.015 *** 0.030 0.015 * 0.203 0.091 * 
Employment tn-t0 <--- Intellectual capital outcomes 11.896 2.105 *** 14.740 3.763 *** 8.744 3.126 * 
 
 
The direct and indirect effect 
 
H Relationships 
Model I  
Entire Sample 
Model II.  
Behavior 
Collaborative Opportunistic 
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect 
H1b 
Intellectual capital inputs → 











Intellectual capital outputs → 











Intellectual capital inputs → 
Intellectual capital outputs → 














[Standardized estimates; CMIN/DF 2.50; GFI 0.891; CFI 0.874; RSEA 0.051] 






Appendix A1: Correlation Matrix 
No. Variable Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Behavior  .592 .492 1.000 
         
          
2 New products tn-t0 8.996 32.820 -.027 1.000 
        
          
3 New services tn-t0 3.764 7.567 
-.067 .162 1.000        
* ***         
4 New processes tn-t0 1.690 6.976 
-.066 .136 .128 1.000       
* *** ***        
5 New patents tn-t0 1.146 5.399 
-.047 .023 .134 .009 1.000      
  ***        
6 New utility models tn-t0 .735 3.402 
-.029 .100 .147 .021 .158 1.000     
 * ***  ***      
7 New dissertations tn-t0 1.243 3.101 
.064 .073 .087 .013 .114 .053 1.000    





-.484 .153 .213 .088 .094 .147 .116 1.000   





.125 .147 .214 .047 .087 .150 .205 .682 1.000  





.315 .054 .099 .014 .088 .071 .138 -.040 .411 1.000 
***  *  * * ***  ***  
11 Experience – scale 2.555 1.090 
-.017 .204 .226 .119 .123 .116 .228 .406 .496 .262 
 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
12 Experience – time 3.489 2.686 
-.145 .208 .273 .163 .178 .134 .265 .399 .364 .120 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
13 Scientific partners t0 2.862 10.224 
-.047 .140 .070 .016 .034 .025 .076 .169 .133 -.031 
 *** *    * *** ***  
14 Commercial partners t0 2.053 13.307 
-.032 .065 .050 .008 .031 .091 .042 .059 .050 .034 
 *    *     
15 Trained employees t0 18.940 71.613 
-.082 .051 .039 .032 .079 .046 .008 .191 .079 -.061 
*    *   *** *  
16 LnSales tn-t0 3.260 5.790 
-.168 .193 .085 .064 .091 .130 .145 .267 .165 .009 
*** *** * * * *** *** *** ***  
17 LnRevenues tn-t0 2.542 5.060 
-.152 .132 .065 .046 .034 .068 .106 .228 .143 .024 
*** *** *   * *** *** ***  
18 LnExport tn-t0 1.615 4.460 
-.172 .149 .138 .023 .152 .109 .070 .282 .179 .011 
*** *** ***  *** * * *** ***  
19 Spillovers tn-t0 .309 .462 
.001 -.018 .016 .009 .024 .020 .015 .117 .181 .135 
       *** *** *** 
20 Employment tn-t0 16.984 39.830 
-.181 .111 .084 .026 .250 .091 .019 .358 .279 .083 
*** * *  *** *  *** *** * 
 
No. Variable Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11 Experience – scale 2.555 1.090 
1.000                   
                    
12 Experience – time 3.489 2.686 
.641 1.000                 
***                   
13 Scientific partners t0 2.862 10.224 
.143 .362 1.000               
*** ***                 
14 Commercial partners t0 2.053 13.307 
.083 .149 .079 1.000             
* *** *               
15 Trained employees t0 18.940 71.613 
.078 .091 .056 .000 1.000           
* *                 
16 LnSales tn-t0 3.260 5.790 
.229 .188 .069 .068 .066 1.000         
*** *** * * *           
17 LnRevenues tn-t0 2.542 5.060 
.170 .118 .062 .046 .101 .641 1.000       
*** ***     *** ***         
18 LnExport tn-t0 1.615 4.460 
.192 .181 .096 .027 .044 .490 .429 1.000     
*** *** *     *** ***       
19 Spillovers tn-t0 .309 .462 
.212 .184 .001 -.015 -.026 .053 .021 .103 1.000   
*** ***           *     
20 Employment tn-t0 16.984 39.830 
.275 .180 .101 .011 .330 .212 .225 .243 .053 1.000 































Commercial partners t0 0.691 
Trained employees t0 0.533 
R&D experience – scale 0.427 










New services tn-t0 0.429 
New processes tn-t0 0.543 
New patents tn-t0 0.529 
New utility models tn-t0 0.370 










LnRevenue tn-t0 0.701 
LnExports tn-t0 0.569 
Spillovers tn-t0 0.955 
Employment tn-t0 0.238 
 
 
 
